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Abstract of 
 
CEO Successor Compensation:  
Outside vs. Inside Successions 
 
 
 
We propose that outside CEO candidates will have greater bargaining power than 
insiders.  As a result, outside CEO successors will likely receive greater total 
compensation than inside CEO successors.  Outside successors, meantime, pose more 
risk to the hiring firm than inside successors due to higher information asymmetry.  As a 
result, outside successor compensation packages are tilted towards more performance-
related pay-at-risk, while inside successor packages have a higher percentage in salary. In 
addition, outside successors may want to utilize the structure of their compensation at 
their previous firm in their new contracts.  Using a sample of 99 firms with outside 
successors who were not CEOs in their prior firms, matched by industry and size to firms 
that hired inside candidates, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, CEO compensation, Inside and Outside CEO 
Successor 
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CEO Successor Compensation:  
Outside vs. Inside Successions 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In today's world of severe economic uncertainty and upheaval, there is an 
increasing scrutiny from the public towards corporate practices especially CEO 
compensation
1
. As governments around the globe, including the U.S. government, 
become a part owner and a major lender to an increasing number of financial institutions 
and corporations, one of the most volatile issues concerning the current wave of 
government bailouts is managerial compensation. Since many CEO compensation 
contracts are negotiated at the time of CEO succession, it is of particular interest to 
examine how boards determine successor CEO compensation. 
Academic research has led to numerous studies that examine CEO compensation
2
 
or CEO succession
3
.  However, with the exception of Barro and Barro (1990), Pfeffer and 
Davis-Blake (1992), and Elsaid and Davidson (2007), there has been little research 
linking CEO compensation and succession. In this paper, we investigate CEO 
compensation changes that occur around a succession and connect CEO succession 
compensation with bargaining theory.   
In CEO succession negotiations, bargaining may occur over many issues 
including but not limited to future directions and plans for the firm, performance 
                                                 
1
 See for example, USA Today, 6/20/2008, CEO Pay Climbs Despite Companies‘ Struggles; Forbes, 
10/23/2008, Executive Compensation Faces Scrutiny; Financial Post, 1/3/2009, Higher Scrutiny Seen for 
CEO Pay, Bonuses.  NY Times, 1/30/2009, Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses ‗Shameful‘. CNN.com, 
2/4/2009, Obama Sets Executive Pay Limits.   
2
 Literature on compensation includes but not limited to Morgan and Poulsen (2001), Toyne, Millar and 
Dixon (2000), Jin (2002), Ryan and Wiggins (2001), Newman and Mozes (1999), and Bryan, Hwang and 
Lilien (2000). 
3
 Literature on succession includes but is not limited to Canella and Shen (2001), Shen and Canella(2002a, 
2002b, 2003), Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003, 2004), and Davidson, Nemec and Worrell (2002). 
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benchmarks and goals, staff member employment and promotions, and of course, 
personal compensations for the new CEO.  Bargaining outcomes are related to the well-
known Nash Equilibrium solution (Rubinstein, 1982; Osborne & Rubinstein, 1990).     
The substance and outcomes of many negotiable items are classified and, therefore, 
unobservable.  However, the outcome of CEO compensation negotiations in public 
companies is observable from both proxy statements and through the financial press.  
In this paper, we compare the bargaining strength of outside CEO candidates with 
that of inside CEO candidates and show how this process affects the amount and structure 
of their compensation packages.  Bargaining theory prescribes a list of non-mutually 
exclusive factors that determines the bargaining power of each negotiator (Muthoo 2000).  
Patience strengthens one‘s bargaining power, while risk aversion weakens it.  Attractive 
alternatives provide credible threats to the counterparty and asymmetric information 
increases the risk in the bargaining process.   
In the CEO compensation negotiation, the patience and degree of risk aversion of 
the board and the CEO candidate are unobservable, even ex post; however, the other 
options facing a candidate can be partially observed.  In addition, the severity of 
information asymmetry between the candidate and the board can be compared between 
an outside candidate and an inside candidate.  Therefore, we base our analyses on the 
attractiveness of a candidate‘s other options and the information asymmetry between the 
board and the candidate.   
The successor candidate‘s bargaining power increases when his other job 
alternatives are attractive.  Although the candidate‘s other potential jobs are not 
observable, we can observe a candidate‘s current job.  Therefore we use a candidate‘s 
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current pay amount and structure as his reservation utility which must be satisfied by the 
hiring firm.  The candidate will only sign a contract that provides him enough expected 
utility to overcome his reservation utility.  This notion of reservation utility as 
opportunity cost prescribes that the more attractive a candidate‘s current compensation, 
the higher his reservation utility will be. Becoming CEO is a promotion for an inside 
candidate, and his current pay amount and structure may not be as attractive as that of the 
outgoing CEO.  However, the same may not be true for an outside candidate.  An outside 
candidate may have considerable current pay that could be greater than that of the 
outgoing CEO and/or he may have a superior pay structure as well.  As a result, the 
reservation utility for an outside candidate is likely higher than that of the inside 
candidate giving the outsider a stronger bargaining position than the inside candidate.  
Murphy and Zabojnik (2004a and 2004b) state that firms are more likely to hire CEOs 
from outside when these individuals‘ general managerial skills are more important than 
the firm-specific skills for the CEO job.  Possession of these skills could lead to higher 
pay for the outside candidate.  However, an outside candidate might seem riskier to the 
hiring board than an inside successor as the board usually knows more about the insider 
than the outsider.   
The stronger bargaining power of the outsiders can give them higher pay and 
more flexibility in re-structuring their compensation packages. Nevertheless, the higher 
risk involved in hiring an outsider may cause the board to tilt the compensation package 
towards more pay-at-risk payment.  In section 2, we develop these hypotheses in further 
details. In section 3 we introduce our sample.  In section 4 we present the methodology 
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and discuss our results.  Finally, we place our conclusions and further discussions in 
section 5. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Reservation Utility from Current Job as Opportunity Cost in Bargaining 
In a CEO succession, the negotiated compensation amount and structure depends 
on the relative bargaining power between the board and the candidate.  Lawler and 
Bacharach (1979) propose that the availability of other alternatives (options) determines 
one‘s bargaining power.  The more alternatives a negotiator possesses, the greater his 
bargaining power.  Muthoo (2000), however, argues that an option has to be attractive 
enough to be a credible threat in the bargaining process, otherwise this option is an empty 
threat and will not provide bargaining power.   
An outside candidate has at least one alternative – his current job in another 
company.  His current total compensation and pay structure would be his reservation 
utility.  Other things being equal, the hiring firm has to offer greater total compensation 
and/or a better pay structure to make him accept the offer.  An inside candidate may also 
have an alternative, which is his current job inside the company.  However, being 
promoted to CEO implies that his reservation utility is lower than the outgoing CEO‘s 
compensation.  Though both candidates have alternatives, the attractiveness of the 
alternatives is likely different.  In terms of compensation, the outside candidate‘s 
alternative could represent a credible threat while the insider‘s alternative may be an 
empty threat;  the reservation utility of the outside candidate could be higher than the 
outgoing CEO‘s current pay while that of the inside candidate would be lower.  This 
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difference in opportunity cost can lead to a difference in the bargaining power between 
the outside candidate and the inside candidate.  The party with a higher opportunity cost 
as reflected by his reservation utility has a stronger bargaining power (Caputo, 2005).  
 
2.2 Inside Succession and Bargaining Power  
Inside successions take place either as a relay in which the firm grooms a 
successor or as a horse race in which several key executives attempt to position 
themselves to be the next CEO (Vancil, 1987).  In a horse race, the board will perceive its 
power as high because it will have numerous potential candidates and may or may not 
value any one more so than the others.  In a relay, the board will place great value on one 
successor, the designate heir, even though there are probably other inside candidates 
lower in the hierarchy who would gladly step in and become CEO.  The availability of 
other willing inside candidates would strengthen the board‘s bargaining position.  
Board negotiation power in an inside succession can also be enhanced when the 
board believes that the candidate has few alternatives.  Inside candidates who are passed 
over for the CEO position often leave the firm ―because they see their future prospects 
diminished, because they find it difficult to work with the winner, or because the new 
CEO desires to hire his own people‖ (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998).  This phenomenon is 
often called ‗up or out‘.   The board knows this up or out enhances its bargaining position 
while the inside candidate knows it weakens his bargaining power as it limits his 
alternatives which may in turn prevent him from being too aggressive in negotiations.  
Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2000) show that firms are more likely to hire inside 
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candidates when there are many potential insiders with considerable commonality.  This 
selection process would weaken the bargaining position of any single inside candidate.   
Based on the analysis in sections 2.1 and 2.2, we propose that outside candidates 
will have greater bargaining power than inside candidates.  As a result, outside candidates 
should achieve higher total compensation than would an insider.  Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is: 
H1:  Outside CEO successors will receive greater total compensation 
than inside CEO successors. 
 
 
2.3 Risks in Hiring an Outsider 
With greater compensation for the outside successor comes greater risk for the 
board. The greater risk would be reflected in the structure of the compensation package.    
The pay package includes a fixed salary and also a pay-at-risk component which depends 
on the performance of the firm. Cao and Wang (2008) show that in CEO contracting, 
total compensation is used to induce retention as a response to a candidate‘s reservation 
utility, while pay-at-risk is used to induce effort as a response to the risk involved in 
hiring a candidate. 
The reason why hiring an inside candidate is less risky than hiring an outside 
candidate lies in the different information asymmetry between the board and the outside 
candidate vs. the board and the inside candidate.  Bargaining in the presence of 
asymmetric information usually leads to an ex post inefficient outcome (Klibanoff and 
Modurch, 1995) or even a hold-up (Muthoo 1999), though Schmitz (2002) documents the 
possibility of ex post efficiency of the outcome.  When hiring a CEO successor, the board 
is likely to be more familiar with an inside candidate than an outside candidate.  This can 
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be particularly true if the insider has worked for the firm for a long time and if the inside 
candidate has been groomed to take on the new CEO position (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 
2004).  The chance that the insider surprises the board with bad management skills and 
the chance of severe conflict with the board are less likely.  However, the same cannot be 
said for an outside successor.  Information asymmetry between the board and the outsider 
is greater due to lack of familiarization.  As a result, hiring an outsider successor can 
impose risk to the hiring company and its board (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003, 2006).   
Although an outsider may have greater bargaining power than an insider and 
receives greater total compensation as predicted by Hypothesis 1, the greater risk 
involved in hiring the outsider may cause the board to tilt the compensation package 
towards more pay-at-risk payment and less toward salary.  Hence our second hypothesis 
is: 
H2: Outside successors will receive greater pay-at-risk payment but less salary 
payment than inside successors. 
 
2.4 Change in the Pay Structure 
In a survey of the literature, Kesnor and Sebora (1994) argue that boards hire 
insiders when they want to maintain the status quo.  Nevertheless, boards hire outsiders 
when they want to instigate change to the status quo.  Firms that hire inside CEO 
successors may be inclined to keep the inside successor‘s compensation structure (fixed 
salary versus pay-at-risk) similar to that of the predecessor (Elsaid & Davidson, 2007).  
That is, if things are going well for the firm, then the board may not want to disrupt what 
currently seems to be working.   The status quo already reflects an increase in 
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compensation for the inside successor.  On the one hand, even if the inside candidate 
wants to change the package, through reduced bargaining power, he may not be able to.   
On the other hand, when hiring an outsider, the board may be more amenable to 
changing the compensation structure from that of the predecessor since hiring an outside 
successor is likely an indication of the board‘s desire for change.  The exact form of these 
changes that the outsider may require can vary by situation.  The outsider, already 
employed elsewhere, may be comfortable with his current pay structure and may want to 
keep a similar structure in the new position.  We therefore propose: 
H3:    An inside successor’s compensation package will be structured 
similarly to that of the predecessor and an outside successor’s 
compensation package will be structured more in line with the 
outsider’s current contract.   
 
 
3.  Data 
3.1 Sample Firms 
We have obtained our sample from the Execucomp database for the years 1992 to 
2003.  Execucomp lists CEO names and compensation details for the S&P 1500 firms 
yearly.  In the year a CEO‘s name changes, a turnover and succession has occurred.  Our 
initial sample includes 749 successions.  Using the Wall Street Journal Index and Lexis-
Nexis, we determine whether the successor was an inside successor (works for the 
company at the time of the succession) or an outsider (does not work for the company at 
the time of the succession).  In our sample, there are 193 outside successions and 556 
inside successions. 
Among the 193 outside successions, 81 of the successors were CEOs at another 
firm.  Because our purpose is to compare outside successions with inside successions, we 
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need to level the playing field first. If  an insider successor was not already a CEO, and if 
an outside successor was a CEO, it would increase the bargaining power of the outsider. 
This dynamic would bias the results in favor of our hypotheses.  Therefore, we limit our 
investigation to outside successors who were not CEOs at other companies at the time of 
the hire. While this leaves 112 outside successions, we are able to obtain compensation 
data on only 99 of them.   
To compare the bargaining power of outsiders to insiders, we also need a sample 
of inside successions.  From the 556 inside successions, we find an inside succession that 
occurred in a firm in the same industry based on SIC codes.  If there is more than one 
industry match, we select the inside successor whose firm‘s asset size is closest in size to 
the outside succession firm.  Various research such as Gabaix and Landier (2008) and 
Cao and Wang (2008) have documented the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm size; therefore, the size restriction is necessary.  This control 
sample contains 99 inside successions, one to match each outside-non-CEO succession
4
. 
 
3.2 Measuring Compensation 
As discussed in Murphy (1999), a typical compensation package includes salary, 
bonus, restricted stock, option grants and other annual compensation, which are all 
provided by Execucomp.  The sum of these compensation components is our measure for 
total compensation.  Salary generally does not depend directly on performance.  The 
other compensation items have some relation to performance (e.g. bonuses are generally 
related to reported profits, restricted stock and options are related to stock performance).  
                                                 
4
 We repeat all the analyses for 81 outside successors who were CEOs previously and compare them with 
81 industry-size matched inside successors. The result is as expected, stronger than what we report here in 
this paper  between the 99 non-CEO outside successors and their matched inside sample. 
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We combine all compensation items other than salary and call them pay-at-risk payments 
since they are not guaranteed. Among the pay-at-risk items, we focus on bonus and 
option grants because they account for the majority of pay-at-risk in our sample. 
We define the year of the succession announcement as year 0.  Because two 
different people serve as CEO in year 0, it is difficult to determine annual compensation.  
Certainly, one could annualize partial year compensation data for both the predecessor 
and successor.  However, there are other factors that may complicate the issue.  Yermack 
(2004) demonstrates that boards often pay departing executives considerable 
compensation in the year of their departure.  This could potentially bias predecessor 
compensation upward.  Similarly, newly hired executives are often given signing 
bonuses, stock grants, or other compensation in their initial year. These incentives could 
also bias year 0 compensation data.  Therefore, we measure compensation for year +1 for 
successors and for year −1 for the predecessors.  This formula/approach avoids the 
problems associated with using year 0 data. 
Our sample period spans 11 years, and for each firm we compare compensation of 
the predecessor in year −1 to the successor in year +1, a two year difference in time.  To 
avoid any bias that may occur due to inflation, we deflate each compensation figure using 
the Consumer Price Index, to 1992 dollar values. 
 
4.  Results 
We test our hypotheses by first comparing the total compensation amount and the 
components of the pay package, the performance-related pay-at-risk component and the 
fixed salary component, between outside successors and inside successors.  We then 
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adopt a cross-section regression framework to further investigate how reservation utility 
and risk affect successor compensation between outside candidates and inside candidates.   
 
4.1 Side-by-side Comparison in Total Pay and Pay Structure: Outsiders vs. Insiders  
Table 1 compares predecessor and successor compensation side by side.  Panel A 
presents predecessor and successor pay for the outside successions.  Panel B presents the 
corresponding results for the industry- and size- matched inside successions.  Both the 
dollar amount and the percentage of the total compensation for several key pay 
components are reported.  Each panel contains 99 successions.  Due to severe skewness 
in the data, we report cross-sectional medians.  The percentage changes in the median 
dollar pay amount from predecessor to successor are also reported. 
-----Insert Table 1 about Here----- 
Outside successions experience a 97% increase in CEO total compensation from 
the predecessor‘s $730K to the successor‘s $1,436K, while inside successions show a 
52% increase from the predecessor‘s $520K to the successor‘s $789K.  The increase in 
total compensation for outside successions is also highly significant with a t-statistic of 
4.877, while the increase for inside successions is marginally significant with t=1.767.  
The highly significant and dramatic increase in outside CEO total compensation is 
consistent with H1.   The increase in total compensation for outsiders comes entirely from 
the increase in the pay-at-risk component. Although outside CEO successors experience a 
33% decrease in salary from the predecessors, a 256% increase in pay-at-risk helps to 
increase total compensation.  Both changes are statistically significant at the 0.001 level 
with t-statistics of −6.447 and +5.138 respectively.  Inside CEO successors, however, 
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receive a significant 39% increase in salary over the predecessor, but a statistically 
insignificant increase in pay-at-risk.  The above difference in the components of outsider 
and insider pay packages is in line with the higher risk involved in hiring an outsider as 
illustrated in our H2.  While the higher risk leads to higher total compensation for 
outsiders, it tilts the compensation package towards greater pay-at-risk.  When we 
examine the two key components of pay-at-risk, bonus and option grants, we find that 
outside successors see a dramatic and highly significant 579% increase in option grants 
while the increase in option grants for inside successors is a less significant 81%.  
The comparison between outside and inside successors can be better seen when 
we look at salary and pay-at-risk as a percentage of the total compensation. The outside 
successor‘s salary accounts for only 15% of total compensation, while the predecessor‘s 
accounts for 50%.  The decrease is statistically significant with a t-statistic of −10.354.  
On the other hand, outsider pay-at-risk accounts for 84% of the total compensation, as 
compared to the predecessor‘s 48%.  The increase is also statistically significant with a t-
statistic of 10.492.  Inside successor compensation packages are structured at a 37-62 
split between salary and pay-at-risk, very similar and statistically indifferent from the 
predecessor‘s 35-63 split.   
Our findings from Table 1 suggest that outside successors receive greater total 
compensation than inside successors relative to that of the predecessors, and this 
difference is driven by pay-at-risk.  These preliminary results are consistent with our first 
and second hypotheses.  While boards may give more total compensation to outsiders, 
they may expect more of outsiders due to higher risk shown by the big increase in pay-at-
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risk.  Next, we explore the successor‘s total compensation and pay package in a cross-
sectional framework.  
 
4.2 Cross-sectional Regressions on Total Compensation: Outsiders vs. Insiders 
For outside and inside successions, we perform a cross-sectional regression with  
 Successor Total Compensation as the dependent variable.  The test variables are the 
variables that represent bargaining power and risk.  For outside successions, bargaining 
power variables include the Successor Total Compensation in Previous Job—a proxy for 
the successor‘s reservation utility, and as a comparison, the total compensation of the 
firm‘s previous CEO—Predecessor Total Compensation.  A successor‘s total 
compensation in his previous job is the opportunity cost that the successor has to forego if 
he accepts the new CEO position.   
Inside successors usually serve as high-level managers in the firm, and their pay is  
highly correlated to the predecessor CEO‘s pay5.  Therefore, for bargaining power 
variables in inside successions, we adopt a 2-stage regression framework.  The first-stage 
regression of the inside successor‘s total compensation in his previous position on the 
predecessor CEO‘s total compensation yields a residual term that represents the part of 
the inside successor‘s total compensation in his previous position that is unrelated to the 
predecessor CEO‘s total compensation.  In a similar fashion, we obtain the residual term 
from regressing the predecessor CEO‘s total compensation on the inside successor‘s total 
compensation in his previous position.  In the second stage, we replace the highly 
                                                 
5
 The pair-wise correlation between Successor Total Compensation in Previous Job and Predecessor Total 
Compensation for inside successions is 0.966 at the 1% significance level, while for outside successions it  
is 0.394 at the 1% level.   Therefore, we decided to pre-whiten the variables for inside successions but not 
for outside successions.   
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correlated inside successor‘s total compensation in his previous position and the 
predecessor CEO‘s total compensation with the two orthogonal residual terms. The two 
residual terms are by design, independent of each other and by including them as the 
explanatory variables, we eliminate the impact from multicollinearity. The regression for 
inside successions is similar to that for outside successions with the only difference being 
the inclusion of the two residual terms.  Other test variables for each regression are 
explained below.   
In addition to the above reservation utility variables that influence the bargaining 
power of the candidate, independent directors can influence the bargaining power of the 
board (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003).  From each firm‘s proxy statement, we determine 
the Percentage of Independent Directors at the time of the succession using the definition 
of independent director in Baysinger and Butler (1985).   
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure information asymmetry 
because it is unobservable even ex post.  Yet, we try to proxy for this risk by using the 
Successor Age and Successor Tenure at the previous job as a rough estimate.  The reason 
behind the choices is that the older the age and the longer the tenure at a previous 
position, the less risky the candidate is.  Low (2005) and Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) 
document a hump-shaped relation between an executive‘s age and his degree of effort 
aversion.  Higher effort aversion is riskier to the hiring firm and performance-related 
profit sharing pay-at-risk payment is usually used to induce effort, thus decreasing effort 
aversion.  In addition, for outsiders, we control for the effect of whether he comes from 
the same industry as the hiring firm (Dorigin).  Davidson, Nemec, and Worrell (2002) show 
that an outside candidate from a different industry represents a riskier hiring decision.  
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Dorigin takes the value of 1 when the outside successor comes from a firm in the same 
industry as his new firm and is 0 otherwise.
 6
 
Control variables are listed below.  First, successions that follow mergers may 
have occurred for reasons different than other successions. Moreover there are additional 
compensation issues involved in mergers such as parachutes for departing executives. To 
control for these possibilities, we add a dummy variable (Dmerger) into the regression.  
Forced turnover can result in different implications for successor compensation and we 
control for this effect by adding a dummy variable Dforedturnover.  Firm size may impact 
compensation too.  Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Cao and Wang (2008) among others, 
show that a CEO‘s pay is positively related to the firm size.  If a firm grows considerably 
from year −1 when we measure the predecessor‘s pay, to year +1 when we measure the 
successor‘s pay, compensation would be expected to increase.  To control for Change in 
Log Firm Size, we compute the difference in the log of firm size in year −1 and year +1 
and include it as a control variable.  Finally, we add Predecessor Age and Predecessor 
Tenure as a comparison with those of the successors.
7
 
The results of outside and inside cross-sectional regressions of successor total 
compensation are reported in Table 2. Outside CEOs total compensation is not 
significantly related to that of their predecessor but is significantly related to what they 
received in the previous job.  The coefficient on Successor Total Compensation in 
Previous Job is 4.460 with a t-statistic of 4.407 while the coefficient on Predecessor 
Total Compensation is an insignificant −0.803.   As a matter of fact, the significance of 
                                                 
6
 We acknowledge that the imprecise estimates for risk may lead to insignificant estimates in our 
regressions. 
7
 We also control for time period differences with a series of dummy variables for each year in the analysis.  
The results are not affected by the inclusion of these dummies.  
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Successor Total Compensation in Previous Job for outside successors helps push the 
Adjusted R
2
 of the regression to 37.3%.  However, for inside CEO successors, neither the 
Residual of Successor Total Compensation in Previous Job nor the Residual of 
Predecessor Total Compensation is significant though the latter has a higher coefficient.   
-----Insert Table 2 about Here----- 
These results are consistent with H3; outside CEO successors tend to receive 
compensation that is similar to their pay at their previous position.  This change may 
come from their increased negotiating power.  It may also come from a board that is 
receptive to change since hiring an outsider has been interpreted as a signal of change.  
Surprisingly, for either the outside or the inside successions, none of the risk variables are 
significant and among the control variables, only the Change in Log Firm Size and  
Predecessor Tenure positively affect the outside successor‘s total compensation at the 
10% significance level.   
 
4.3 Cross-sectional Regressions on the Components of the Compensation Package: 
Outsiders vs. Insiders 
To further investigate why the total compensation between outside successors and 
inside successors differs, we examine the structure of the compensation package in the 
cross-sectional framework.  We partition total compensation into salary and pay-at-risk 
payments.   
The dependent variable Successor Compensation Component refers to the 
successor‘s salary in dollar amount, pay-at-risk in dollar amount, % salary (Salary/Total 
Compensation) and % pay-at-risk (pay-at-risk/Total Compensation) respectively.  The 
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explanatory variable Successor Compensation Component in Previous Job refers to the 
corresponding successor‘s previous pay component.  Predecessor Compensation 
Component refers to the predecessor CEO‘s corresponding pay component.  The rest of 
the explanatory variables remain the same. 
Similar to the total compensation of inside successors, the salary and pay-at-risk 
components of inside successor‘s previous position are also highly correlated with the 
predecessor CEO‘s salary and pay-at-risk8.  As a result, a similar 2-stage regression 
framework is adopted for inside successor‘s pay components.   
Table 3 reports the results for outside CEO contracts, and Table 4 reports the 
results for the matched sample of inside CEO contracts.   The result that stands out from 
Table 3 is the overall significance and dominance of Successor Compensation 
Component in Previous Job over Predecessor Compensation Component no matter which 
pay component is at issue.  All four Successor Compensation Component in Previous Job 
measures, salary, pay-at-risk, % salary and % pay-at-risk, have significant and positive 
coefficients at the 0.001 level.  However, except for a 5% significant coefficient of 0.302 
on Predecessor Salary, all the other Predecessor Compensation Component measures 
have insignificant coefficients.  
-----Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about Here----- 
The estimated coefficient for the outside successor‘s salary in his previous firm is 
positive and significant (t = 3.451) while the estimated coefficient for the predecessor‘s 
salary is statistically less significant (t = 2.385).  When the pay-at-risk component is the 
                                                 
8
 The correlation between inside Successor Compensation Component and Predecessor Compensation 
Component is 0.776 for salary, 0.969 for pay-at-risk, 0.946 for %salary, and 0.955 for % pay-at-risk. All 
are significant at the 1% level. On the contrary, for outside successions, the correlations are 0.411, 0.311, 
0.413 and 0.148, with the first two significant at the 1% level. 
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dependent variable, the results are similar; the estimated coefficient for the successors‘ 
pay-at-risk in their prior firm is positive and significant (t = 4.751) while the estimated 
coefficient for the predecessor‘s pay-at-risk is statistically insignificant.  This result 
suggests that the outside successor‘s pay components, whether salary or pay-at-risk, 
whether in dollar amount or in percentage terms, are more closely related to what he 
earned in his previous job than to what his predecessor received. Thus, consistent with 
H3, not only do outside successors have a similar total compensation amount to what their 
previous jobs offered, they also have a compensation structure that is more similar to 
what they had previously than to that of their predecessors.   
In Table 4, we report the 2-stage regressions on the matched sample of inside 
successors.  The results show that both the Residual of Successor Compensation 
Component in Previous Job and the Residual of Predecessor Compensation Component 
are insignificant for pay-at-risk.  However they both turn positive and significant for the 
remaining three component measures and the magnitude and t-statistics on the coefficient 
estimates of the Residual of Predecessor Compensation Component are all slightly higher 
than those of the Residual of Successor Compensation Component in Previous Job. The 
results seem to suggest that an inside successor‘s compensation is linked to both his 
predecessor‘s package and his own previous package, even after accounting for the high 
correlation between the two factors.   
In conclusion, an outside successor‘s compensation is related more to his own 
prior compensation than to what his predecessor experienced.   The results generally 
support the hypothesis that outside successors have more bargaining power than inside 
successors in that they are able to renegotiate the pay contract in a structure that is similar 
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to what they received in their previous jobs.  For inside successors, their compensation is 
related to both the successor‘s previous compensation and predecessor‘s compensation.  
Risk variables remain insignificant as indicted in  Table 3 and Table 4, and the majority 
of the control variables remain insignificant.   
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper we compare the bargaining power between an outside and an inside 
CEO successor by investigating their total compensation and their pay structure.  Under 
the guidelines of classic bargaining theory, we base our analysis on a candidate‘s 
reservation utility (alternative options) and the information asymmetry between the 
candidate and the hiring board. We propose that outside successors have higher 
bargaining power than inside successors due to their higher reservation utility, while 
outside successors pose a higher risk to the hiring company due to more severe 
information asymmetry.  As a result, outside successors see their compensation package 
tilted more towards pay-at-risk than to fixed salary.   
Empirical results from 99 outside CEO successions industry-size matched with 99 
inside successions during the period 1992 to 2003 are consistent with our hypotheses.  
We find that outside CEO successors receive greater total compensation than inside 
successors, an indication of the higher bargaining power of outside successors, though 
both increase from that of the predecessors.  Most of the increase in outsider total 
compensation comes from the increase in performance related pay-at-risk.  In fact, our 
sample outside successors‘ salaries drop from those of the predecessors, but are 
overcompensated by the bigger increase in pay-at-risk.  This finding is consistent with the 
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notion that hiring an outsider is risky.  In addition, outside candidates have a 
compensation package that is structured similarly to what they had in their prior firms.  
CEOs selected from the inside see their compensation structure determined by both the 
predecessor‘s and their own past package.   
Current academic research is grounded with numerous studies that examine 
executive compensation or CEO succession.  Compensation studies generally focus on 
the compensation of sitting CEOs.  The problem with this approach is that once a CEO is 
in office, it is difficult to change the structure of the CEO‘s contract (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2004).  Incumbent CEOs are able to exert considerable influence over the board and the 
board‘s compensation committee.  As a result, once a compensation contract is in place, it 
is rarely renegotiated unless it changes to increase the incumbent CEO‘s pay (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004).  At the time of succession, the board has the opportunity to change the 
compensation contract from that of the predecessor.  Our primary contribution is that we 
are able to show how the bargaining power of the successor influences compensation 
outcomes.    
Since this is the first attempt to relate bargaining power of successor CEOs and 
boards to compensation, our measures of bargaining power may be somewhat crude.  
Future research could be directed at this issue and could develop alternate and more 
refined measures of both board and successor CEO bargaining power. 
Furthermore, we are only able to examine the compensation issue in the board-
successor CEO negotiations because most other negotiation issues are not readily 
transparent.  When and if other data become available, future researchers could possibly 
measure other types of negotiation outcomes that occur in the successor bargaining 
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process.  Some of these issues may be unrelated to compensation.  Other issues could be 
related to non-monetary compensation such as the CEO‘s use of company airplanes and 
cars or perks such as country club memberships.  
In our research, we relate the successor compensation to that of the predecessor 
and that of the successor‘s prior compensation.  Future research could also be directed at 
other ways that boards make compensation decisions for successors.  For example, 
industry compensation trends may be an important determinant.  We can only speculate, 
but perhaps inside successor compensation is at least partially determined by the trends in 
the company‘s own industry while that of outsiders may be determined by the industry 
trends of the outsider‘s prior industry. 
Our results could be evaluated under an alternative theoretical perspective – 
power dependence theory.  This theory proposes that bargaining tactics and outcomes 
will depend on each party‘s dependence on the outcomes (Lawler & Bacharach, 1979).  
These authors define dependence as alternatives and value.  Parties to a negotiation will 
have greater (lesser) bargaining power when they have other (no-other or few) 
alternatives and when they place low (high) value on the outcome of the negotiation.  
Future research could focus on this alternative theoretical perspective to determine if it 
also validates the results that we find. 
 In providing an apple-to-apple comparison between outside and inside CEO 
successors, we do not present results for outside successors who used to be CEOs at other 
companies.  Given that outside successors often hold the CEO position in their previous 
firms, future research could be directed at this angle and compare with the results 
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provided in this paper.  Such an approach would help clarify how the outside successor‘s 
previous position affects bargaining power.   
Finally, we have proposed that outside CEOs are a riskier choice for boards 
because of information asymmetry when hiring an outsider.  There may be other ways to 
measure information asymmetry and to retest our suppositions.  For example, information 
asymmetry of all outsiders may not be the same and there may be different information 
asymmetry between various inside candidates as well.  Future research could be directed 
at this issue. 
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Table 1: Side-by-side Comparison of Predecessor and Successor Pay 
Outside vs. Inside successors 
 
Panel A Dollar Amount (000s) 
 
  % of Total Compensation 
Outside Succession Predecessor Successor t- statistics %change Predecessor  Successor t- statistics 
Total Compensation 730 1436   4.877***   97% 
   Salary 317   213 −6.447*** −33% 50 15 −10.354*** 
Pay-at-risk 312 1112   5.138***  256% 48 84   10.492*** 
Bonus   92   146   1.701†   58% 10   7 −1.411 
Option Grants   94   639   4.742*** 579% 18 59    8.735*** 
        Panel B Dollar Amount (000s) 
 
  % of Total Compensation 
Inside Succession Predecessor Successor t- statistics %change Predecessor  Successor t- statistics 
Total Compensation 520 789 1.767† 52% 
   Salary 189 263 10.801*** 39% 35 37   0.180 
Pay-at-risk 298 474 1.645 59% 63 62 −0.004 
Bonus   81 127 1.902† 58% 12 16    0.359 
Option Grants 135 245 1.720† 81% 29 34    0.601 
 
This table reports the cross-sectional medians in predecessor and successor compensations.  T-statistics are 
for pair-wise comparison between predecessor and successor.  % change from predecessor to successor is 
based on the reported median dollar amount in payment.  In Panel A, the sample consists of 99 outside 
CEO successions that occurred between 1992 and 2003.  In Panel B, the sample consists of 99 inside 
successions matched by industry and firm size.   
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Table 2: Cross-sectional Regression of Successor Total Compensation 
Outside vs. Inside successors 
 
  Outside  
Successor 
Total  
Compensation 
Inside  
Successor 
Total 
Compensation 
Independent 
Variables 
Constant 7537.645 
(0.988) 
6062.186 
(1.238) 
Bargaining 
power variables 
Successor Total 
Compensation in 
Previous Job 
4.460 
(4.407)*** 
-- 
 Predecessor Total 
Compensation 
−0.803 
(−1.041) 
-- 
 Residual of Successor 
Total Compensation 
in Previous Job 
-- 7.694 
(1.500) 
 Residual of 
Predecessor Total 
Compensation 
-- 10.066 
(1.441) 
 Percentage of 
Independent directors 
 
237.338 
(0.065) 
1831.641 
(0.451) 
Risk variables Successor Age −166.437 
(−1.561) 
−27.820 
(−0.342) 
 Successor Tenure 101.403 
(1.117) 
84.704 
(1.146) 
 Dorigin  757.748 
(0.449) 
-- 
Control variables  Dmerger  1246.268 
(0.577) 
−2052.362 
(−0.882) 
 Dforcedturnover  1883.059 
(1.117) 
−1194.726 
(−0.715) 
 Change in Log Firm 
Size 
853.872 
(1.918)† 
−802.237 
(−0.609) 
 Predecessor Age 29.729 
(0.383) 
−34.125 
(−0.466) 
 Predecessor Tenure 162.183 
(1.896)† 
−82.205 
(−1.128) 
Adjusted R
2 
      (F) 
 37.3% 
(3.046)** 
−1.3% 
(0.946) 
 
*** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05, † Significant at 0.10 
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Successor Total Compensation is the dollar amount (000s) of the successor‘s total compensation in the year 
after becoming CEO.  Successor Total Compensation in Previous Job is the dollar amount (000s) of the 
successor‘s total compensation in his previous job. Residual of Successor Total Compensation in Previous 
Job is the residual term from regressing Successor Total Compensation in Previous Job on Predecessor 
Total Compensation.  Predecessor Total Compensation is the dollar amount (000s) of the previous CEO‘s 
total compensation. Residual of Predecessor Total Compensation is the residual term from regressing 
Predecessor Total Compensation on Successor Total Compensation in Previous Job.  Percentage of 
Independent Directors is the percent of independent directors on the board.  Successor Age is the 
successor‘s age at the year of the succession. Successor Tenure is the successor‘s tenure in the previous 
position.  Dorigin equals to 1 if the successor is from the same industry according to SIC code and equal to 0 
otherwise.  Dmerger equals to 1 if the succession occurred as a result of a merger and 0 otherwise.  
Dforcedturnover equals to 1 for forced turnover and 0 for voluntary turnover.  Change in Log Firm Size is the 
difference between the natural log of the total assets of the firm at the year after the succession and the year 
prior to the succession.  Predecessor Age is the predecessor‘s age at the year of the succession.  
Predecessor Tenure is the predecessor‘s tenure as CEO.  Collinearity diagnostics and all variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are less than 10.  The sample firms are described in Table 1. 
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Table 3:  Outside Successor Compensation Structure 
 
                                Dependent: Successor Compensation Component 
Independent 
Variables 
 Salary Pay-At-
Risk 
%Salary %Pay-At-
Risk  
 Constant -85.158 
(-.379) 
8352.519 
(1.133) 
−0.471 
(−1.317) 
0.826 
(1.977)† 
Bargaining power 
variables 
Successor 
Compensation 
Component in 
Previous Job 
0.509 
(3.451)*** 
5.225 
(4.751)*** 
0.575 
(3.997)*** 
0.594 
(4.087)*** 
 Predecessor 
Compensation  
Component 
0.302 
(2.385)* 
−1.183 
(−1.528) 
0.057 
(0.538) 
0.027 
(0.241) 
 Percentage of 
Independent 
directors 
 
−183.797 
(−1.731)† 
436.102 
(0.125) 
−0.097 
(−0.528) 
0.064 
(0.339) 
Risk variables Successor 
Age 
−1.788 
(−0.546) 
−153.166 
(−1.491) 
0.008 
(1.523) 
−0.007 
(−1.331) 
 Successor 
Tenure 
−1.370 
(−0.511) 
97.005 
(1.109) 
−0.003 
(−0.571) 
0.002 
(0.550) 
 Dorigin  −52.141 
(−1.033) 
758.112 
(0.466) 
−0.019 
(−0.214) 
0.019 
(0.209) 
Control variables  Dmerger  −15.267 
(−0.229) 
1102.481 
(0.530) 
−0.013 
(−0.125) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
 Dforcedturnover  29.270 
(0.579) 
1549.268 
(0.949) 
0.005 
(0.063) 
−0.008 
(−0.092) 
 Change in 
Log Firm Size 
8.059 
(0.566) 
734.658 
(1.723)† 
0.013 
(0.609) 
−0.017 
(−0.752) 
 Predecessor 
Age 
6.921 
(3.317)** 
6.050 
(0.080) 
0.002 
(0.495) 
−0.002 
(−0.539) 
 Predecessor 
Tenure 
−2.632 
(−1.053) 
172.768 
(2.074)* 
−0.005 
(−1.280) 
0.006 
(1.381) 
Adjusted R
2 
      (F) 
 43.9% 
(3.891)*** 
40.1% 
(3.304)*** 
32.2% 
(2.482)* 
30.7% 
(2.383)* 
 
*** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05, † Significant at 0.10 
Successor Compensation Component refers to the component of the pay package for the successor.  
Successor Compensation Component in Previous Job refers to the successor‘s pay component in his 
previous job.  Predecessor Compensation Component refers to the predecessor CEO‘s pay component.  A 
pay component includes salary and pay-at-risk (in 000‘s dollars and as a % of the total compensation), with 
each matching the dependent variable of the regression. The remaining variables are defined in Table 2 and 
the sample firms are described in Table 1. Collinearity diagnostics and all variance inflation factors (VIF) 
are less than 10. 
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Table 4: Inside Successor Compensation Structure 
Dependent: Successor Compensation Component 
Independent 
Variables 
 Salary Pay-At-
Risk 
%Salary  %Pay-At-
Risk  
 Constant 298.769 
(3.763)*** 
5486.464 
(1.204) 
−0.197 
(−0.603) 
1.157 
(3.487)*** 
Bargaining 
power 
variables 
Residual of 
Successor 
Compensation 
Component in 
Previous Job 
1.156 
(8.148)*** 
7.651 
(1.417) 
3.512 
(2.726)** 
4.848 
(3.245)** 
 Residual of 
Predecessor 
Compensation 
Component 
2.273 
(11.328)*** 
9.901 
(1.335) 
3.769 
(2.884)** 
5.052 
(3.348)** 
 Percentage of 
Independent 
directors 
 
83.250 
(1.350) 
1942.227 
(0.516) 
−0.240 
(−0.946) 
0.253 
(0.998) 
Risk variables Successor Age −1.356 
(−1.036) 
−28.265 
(−0.371) 
0.002 
(0.387) 
−0.003 
(−0.518) 
 Successor Tenure 0.437 
(0.397) 
75.945 
(1.111) 
−0.006 
(−1.312) 
0.005 
(1.131) 
Control 
variables  
Dmerger  −20.269 
(−0.562) 
−2004.73 
(−0.928) 
0.101 
(0.671) 
−0.098 
(−0.653) 
 Dforcedturnover  −32.136 
(−1.230) 
−1106.74 
(−0.714) 
−0.023 
(−0.210) 
0.025 
(0.233) 
 Change in Log 
Firm Size 
17.291 
(0.847) 
−759.914 
(−0.624) 
−0.034 
(−0.400) 
0.042 
(0.489) 
 Predecessor Age 0.929 
(0.775) 
−33.193 
(−0.490) 
0.010 
(2.115)* 
−0.009 
(−1.930)† 
 Predecessor 
Tenure 
−1.128 
(−0.988) 
−75.255 
(−1.117) 
0.004 
(0.783) 
−0.004 
(−0.794) 
Adjusted R
2 
      (F) 
 71.7% 
(12.298)*** 
−0.9% 
(0.962) 
18.1% 
(1.929)* 
23.1% 
(2.263)* 
*** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05, † Significant at 0.10 
 
  
Residual of Successor Compensation Component in Previous Job and Residual of Predecessor 
Compensation Component are residual terms from regressing Successor Compensation Component in 
Previous Job on Predecessor Compensation Component and vice versa.  The remaining variables and 
sample definitions are the same as in Tables 1, 2 and 3.  Collinearity diagnostics and all variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are less than 10. 
 
 
 
